Saturday, December 23, 2017

Whether directing wife not to chat on facebook amounts to cruelty to wife as per S 498A of IPC?

 In paragraph 14 of the complaint, it is alleged that the accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 forced the complainant to apologize and make a solemn promise that the complainant shall not chat on "ORKUT", a social networking site. I do not think that even this allegation can amount to harassment within the meaning of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code as it has no relation to driving the complainant into such behavior as to endanger her life or cause injury to herself. This allegation also does not have any relation to coercing of the complainant into meeting any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. On the contrary, spending long time on social networking site such as "ORKUT" or "FACEBOOK" by a person can be viewed as mental harassment by another spouse and, therefore, if the spouse is advised to spend loss time on a social networking site or desist from visiting it, the advice is capable as being seen as made with a view to keep the marriage intact and not otherwise.
Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014
Decided On: 14.01.2015
 Gopal and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.


1. Heard. Admit.
2. Heard finally by consent.
3. By this application, the applicants have sought quashing of the order dated 22.2.2012 issuing process against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 417 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also quashing of the complaint filed against them by respondent No. 2.
4. According to the learned counsel for the applicants, there is not even a whisper of allegations made against both these accused constituting essential ingredients of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code. In support, he has taken me through the complaint, copy of which has been filed on record as Annexure-2. Learned counsel for the Non-applicant No. 2 states that the applicants should not shy away from the trial and whatever they are submitting now can be submitted by them on merits of the case and, therefore, it would be premature for this Court to allow this petition. He also submits that the allegations made against both the applicants, as can be seen from the paragraphs 4, 13 and 14 in the complaint are sufficient to indicate that prima facie case for the alleged offences has been made out against both the applicants.
5. Learned A.P.P. for the Non-applicant No. 1/State submits that an appropriate order may be passed in this case.
6. Upon careful examination of the complaint filed by the Non-applicant No. 2 against the applicants and other persons, I find that so far as present applicants are concerned, there is not even a single allegation which, if taken at face value would constitute any of the offences alleged against these applicants. These allegations neither show any prima facie cruelty having been meted out by the applicants to Non-applicant No. 2 nor any cheating or criminal breach of trust having been prima facie committed in respect of valuable articles, which the Non-applicant No. 2 says to be a stridhan.
7. In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.
8. In paragraph 13 of the complaint, what is stated is that there was a meeting on 18.5.2010 at the residence of the applicant No. 2 in which meeting, applicant No. 2, together with accused No. 1-Vaibhav and accused No. 3-Anuradha levelled several false and baseless allegations against the Non-applicant No. 2 in the presence of remaining accused persons. However, what allegations were levelled against her, has not been mentioned by the Non-applicant No. 2. On the basis of statement that false and baseless allegations have been made by one person against another, offence of cruelty is not prima facie constituted. Making of such a statement only discloses the opinion of it's maker and, therefore, the complainant, who wishes to prove her case of cruelty, must specify the allegations in the complaint so as to enable the other side to meet them appropriately and also enable the Court to decide, as to whether or not these allegations really constitute in law the offence of cruelty, which is not the case here. The statements so made in paragraph 13, therefore, cannot be considered to be sufficient for prima facie constituting offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The statement in paragraph 13 attributed to applicant No. 1 which is to the effect that he has advised Non-applicant No. 2 to mend her ways and improve herself, which is nothing but giving of an elderly advice, wrongly or rightly and it cannot amount to cruelty.
9. In paragraph 14 of the complaint, it is alleged that the accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 forced the complainant to apologize and make a solemn promise that the complainant shall not chat on "ORKUT", a social networking site. I do not think that even this allegation can amount to harassment within the meaning of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code as it has no relation to driving the complainant into such behavior as to endanger her life or cause injury to herself. This allegation also does not have any relation to coercing of the complainant into meeting any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. On the contrary, spending long time on social networking site such as "ORKUT" or "FACEBOOK" by a person can be viewed as mental harassment by another spouse and, therefore, if the spouse is advised to spend loss time on a social networking site or desist from visiting it, the advice is capable as being seen as made with a view to keep the marriage intact and not otherwise.
10. Except the above referred allegations, there are no other allegations made against both the applicants and learned counsel for the Non-applicant No. 2-complainant could also not show to me any other allegations except for the afore stated allegations. I have already found that the afore stated allegations do not prima facie constitute any of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, no process for these offences could have been issued against both these applicants. Although learned Magistrate, while issuing process has observed in the order that he has read the complaint, the above referred discussion would show the position to be otherwise. He does not seem to have read the complaint properly. The allegations contained in the complaint, so far as present applicants are concerned, do not make out any case and, therefore, disagreeing with learned counsel for the Non-applicant No. 2, I find that calling upon the applicants to face the ordeal of trial in such a situation would amount to grave injustice to the applicants. The complaint, therefore, as against both the applicants deserves to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the application is allowed.
11. The impugned order of issuance of process under Sections 498-A, 406 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code against the applicants is hereby quashed and set aside.
12. The complaint as against both the applicants also stands dismissed. The trial as against remaining accused persons, however, shall proceed further in accordance with law.

Res Judicata

Res Judicata is a phrase which has been evolved from a Latin maxim, which stand for ‘the thing has been judged’, meaning there by that the issue before the court has already been decided by another court, between the same parties. Therefore, the court will dismiss the case before it as being useless. Res Judicata as a concept is applicable both in case of Civil as well as Criminal legal system.

The term is also used to mean as to ‘bar re-litigation’ of such cases between the same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. Once a final judgment has been announced in a lawsuit, the subsequent judges who are confronted with a suit that is identical to or substantially the same as the earlier one, they would apply the Res Judicata doctrine ‘to preserve the effect of the first judgment’. This is to prevent injustice to the parties of a case supposedly finished, but perhaps mostly to avoid unnecessary waste of resources and time of the Judicial System.

And, therefore, the same case cannot be taken up again either in the same or in the different Court of India. This is just to prevent them from multiplying judgments, so a prevailing plaintiff may not recover damages from the defendant twice for the same injury.

For making Res Judicata binding, several factors must be met up with:
• identity in the thing at suit;
• identity of the cause at suit;
• identity of the parties to the action;
• identity in the designation of the parties involved;
• whether the judgment was final;
• whether the parties were given full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue.

Regarding designation of the parties involved, a person may be involved in an action while filling a given office and may subsequently initiate the same action in a differing capacity. In that case Res Judicata would not be available as a defense unless the defendant could show that the differing designations were not legitimate and sufficient.

Therefore, Res Judicata in a nut shell is a judicial concept wherein the Courts do not allow a petition to be filed in the same or to the other Court for the doctrine of Res Judicata would apply and the party would not be allowed to file the petition or to continue the petition (as the case may be).

The sphere of Res Judicata is ever growing. Although the Civil Procedure does not apply to the proceedings other than suits. Whereas in Administrative Law, the concept of Res Judicata deals only in aspects related to the Writ Proceedings.

Brief History and Origin of Res Judicata

“Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” is the full latin maxim which has, over the years, shrunk to mere “Res Judicata” .
The concept of Res Judicata finds its evolvement from the English Common Law system, being derived from the overriding concept of judicial economy, consistency, and finality . From the common law, it got included in the Code of Civil Procedure and which was later as a whole was adopted by the Indian legal system.

From the Civil Procedure Code, the Administrative Law witnesses its applicability. Then, slowly but steadily the other acts and statutes also started to admit the concept of Res Judicata within its ambit.
Res Judicata as a concept under Civil Procedure Code 1908

The doctrine of Res Judicata in nations that have a civil law legal system is much narrower in scope than in common law nations . According to the dictionary meaning, ‘Res Judicata’ means a case or suit involving a particular issue between two or more parties already decided by a court. Thereafter, if either of the parties approaches the same court for the adjudication of the same issue, the suit will be struck by the law of ‘res judicata’.

Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure deals with this concept. It embodies the doctrine of Res Judicata or the rule of conclusiveness of a judgement, as to the points decided either of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. It enacts that once a matter is finally decided by a competent court; no party can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. In the absence of such a rule there will be no end to litigation and the parties would be put to constant trouble, harassment and expenses.
The doctrine of Res Judicata is based on three Roman maxims:

Nemo debet lis vaxari pro eadem causa which means that no man should be vexed (annoyed) twice for the same cause;
(b) Interest republicae ut sit finis litium meaning thereby that it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to a litigation; and
(c) Re judicata pro veritate occipitur which bears the meaning as a judicial decision must be accepted as correct.

The pre-requisites which are necessary for Res Judicata are:
1) There must be a final judgment;
2) The judgment must be on the merits;
3) The claims must be the same in the first and second suits;
4) The parties in the second action must be the same as those in the first, or have been
represented by a party to the prior action.

The provisions of Section 11 are not at all exhaustive even though it has very wide and enlarged amplitude.

The section “does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court” but “operates as a par to the trial” of the suit or issue, if the matter in the suit was directly and substantially in issue (and finally decided) in the previous suit between the same parties litigating under the same title in a Court, then they are not competent i.e. they become barred to try the subsequent suit in which such issue has been raised.

Thus, this doctrine of Res Judicata is a fundamental concept based on public policy and private interest. It is conceived in the larger public interest, which requires that every litigation must come to an end. It therefore, applies to civil suits, execution proceedings, arbitration proceedings, taxation matters, writ petitions, administrative orders, interim orders, criminal proceedings, etc.

An ordinary litigation being a party or claiming under a party of a former suit cannot avoid the applicability of section 11 of C.P.C. as it is mandatory except on the ground of fraud or collusion as the case may be. The onus of proof lies on the party relying on the theory of Res Judicata. The provisions of section 11 of C.P.C. are “not directory but mandatory”. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by taking recourse to section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act on the ground of fraud or collusion.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Das Gupta in Satyadhan Ghosal v. Deorajan Deb said that ‘the principle of Res Judicata is based on the need of giving finality to the judicial decisions’.

Over-view of Res Judicata as a concept under Administrative Law

Basically, the Doctrine of Res Judicata is applicable to the Code of Civil Procedure. But, at times, in many other statutes there is a use of the doctrine.
As we know that the work or the role played by the Administrative Law is that of a watch dog. The Administrative Law sees that there is no use of power which has a malicious intention. The Administrative Law is there to see that there is an improvement in the society without any hurdles and the administration performs its duty in an honest manner.

In Administrative Law, the use of this doctrine is that, it administers as to how well the Judiciary does its work, how efficiently the Judiciary disposes off the case and the doctrine makes itself applicable where there is more than one petition filed in the same or in the other court of India.

The parties can file another suit in another court, just to harass and malign the reputation of the opposite party or can do so for receiving compensation twice from the different courts. Therefore, just to prevent such over-loads and extra cases in the court’s kitty, Res Judicata holds a big responsibility and importance.
A comparison of Res Judicata as a concept in between Administrative Law and the other laws. In Administrative Law, the doctrine works as a working principle and has been adopted or taken from Code of Civil Procedure. In C.P.C., as we have discussed above, Section 11 has a big role to be played in the civil courts of India. Even in International Law which is applicable in The International Court of Justice, there too Section 38 (1) (c) is dedicated towards the doctrine of Res Judicata.

The Section reads as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

The principles of Res Judicata even apply to the Constitution matters. The rule of Res Judicata is basically a rule of private law but has been transposed into the area of writ proceedings as well. Thus, the person is debarred from taking one proceeding after another and urging new grounds every time, in respect of one and the same ground every time causing harassment to the opposite party. Therefore, a subsequent writ petition cannot be moved against the judgement of a petition in a particular High Court. The judgement can be of any nature and of any High Court, but that order cannot be in any sense be challenged.

The Criminal Law and to be more specific, Evidence Law also talks about the doctrine of Res Judicata but in the same context as that has been used in C.P.C. Therefore, apart from the Administrative Law and C.P.C., there are some few other laws which talk about the role of Res Judicata in the statute.

The Nature of Res Judicata

The Doctrine of Res Judicata strives to strike a balance between the two largely separated poles. One pit assures an efficient judicial system that renders final judgments with certainty and prevents the inequity of a defendant having to defend the same claim or issue of law repeatedly. On the other hand, it protects the plaintiff’s interest in having issues and claims fully and fairly litigated.

A US Supreme Court Justice explained the need for this legal precept as follows:
Federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Under Res Judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties . . . from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude re-litigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first cause. As this court and other courts have often recognized, res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the costs and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on a judication
The basic point involved in the Nature of the doctrine of Res Judicata is that the doctrine tries to bring in natural and fair justice to the parties and that too by barring the other party to file a multiple number of suits either for justice or for harassing the other party.

Res judicata includes two related concepts: claim preclusion, and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), though sometimes Res Judicata is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion. Claim preclusion focuses on barring a suit from being brought again on a legal cause of action that has already been finally decided between the parties. Issue preclusion bars the re-litigation of factual issues that have already been necessarily determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier claim.

It is often difficult to determine which, if either, of these apply to later lawsuits that are seemingly related, because many causes of action can apply to the same factual situation and vice versa.

Therefore, the nature of the doctrine of Res Judicata is to enable the Courts deliver the justice and then to dismiss or freeze the other active suits which are of the very same nature although is at different stage. Such a role enables the Court to dismiss the matter from its jurisdiction and also the jurisdiction of the other Courts which are at the same level.

Also that Res Judicata does not restrict the appeals process, which is considered a linear extension of the same lawsuit as it travels up (and back down) the appellate court ladder. Appeals are considered the appropriate manner by which it to challenge a judgment rather than trying to start a new trial, and once the appeals process is exhausted or waived, Res Judicata will apply even to a judgment that is contrary to law.

Scope of Res Judicata

The Scope of Res Judicata has very well been decided in the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. where the code embodies the rules of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea of an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially an issue becomes final. Section 11 does create any right or interest over the property but merely operates as a bar to try the issue ‘once again’. The Court is assumed and applied to all the judicial bodies working in India.

The scope of an earlier judgment is probably the most difficult question that judges must resolve in applying res judicata. Sometimes merely part of a subsequent lawsuit will be affected, such as a single claim being struck from a complaint, or a single factual issue being removed from reconsideration in the new trial. The principle of Res Judicata has been held to be of wider application on the basis of the wider principle of the finality of decision by Courts of law and a decision under Section 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act of 1934 was held to operate as Res Judicata Section 11 CPC which embodies the principle of Res Judicata has been held to be not exhaustive and even though a matter may not be directly covered by the provisions of that section the matter may still be Res Judicata on general principles.
The scope of the principle of Res Judicata is not confined to what is contained in Section 11 but is of more general application. Res Judicata could be as much applicable to different stages of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits.

In the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, where the principle of Res Judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit the nature of the proceedings, the scope of the enquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached as well as the specific provision made on matters touching such decisions are some of the factors to be considered before the principle is held to be applicable. Order IX Rule 7 does not put an- end to the litigation nor does it involve the determination of any issues in controversy in the suit. A decision or direction in an interlocutory proceeding of the type provided for by Order IX Rule 7 is not of the kind which can operate as Res Judicata so as to bar the hearing on the, merits of an application under Order IX Rule 13.

Exceptions to Res Judicata

However, there are limited exceptions to Res Judicata that allow a party to attack the validity of the original judgment, even outside of appeals. These exceptions – usually called collateral attacks – are typically based on procedural or jurisdictional issues, based not on the wisdom of the earlier court’s decision but its authority or competence to issue it. A collateral attack is more likely to be available (and to succeed) in judicial systems with multiple jurisdictions, such as under federal governments, or when a domestic court is asked to enforce or recognise the judgment of a foreign court.

In addition, in cases involving due process, cases that appear to be Res Judicata may be re-litigated. An instance would be the establishment of a right to counsel. People who have had their liberty taken away (that is, imprisoned) may be allowed to be re-tried with a counselor as a matter of fairness.

Judicial Pronouncements in relation to Res Judicata:-

In the case of Jallur Venkata Seshayya vs. Thadviconda Koteswara Rao, a suit was filed in the Court for the purpose of declaring certain temples public temples and for setting aside alienation of endowed property by the manager thereof. A similar suit was dismissed by the Court two years ago and the plaintiffs here contended that it was the gross negligence on the part of the plaintiffs (of the previous suit) and hence the doctrine of Res Judicata should not be applied. But, the Privy Council said that finding of a gross negligence by the trial court was far from a finding of intentional suppression of the documents, which would amount, to want of bona fide or collusion on the part of the plaintiffs in prior suit. There being no evidence in the suit establishing either want of bona fide of collusion on the part of plaintiffs as res judicata.

In the case of Beliram and Brothers vs. Chaudari Mohammed Afzal, it was held that where a minors suit was not brought by the guardian of the minors bona fide but was brought in collusion with the defendants and the suit was a fictitious suit, a decree obtained therein is one obtained by fraud and collusion within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 44 and does not operate Res Judicata. The principle of Res Judicata in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 11 is modified by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 44 and the principles will not apply if any of the three grounds mentioned in s. 44 exists. General principles may not be applied in a way making Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 11 nugatory.

In the case of Rural Litigation And Entitlement Kendra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was held that the writ petitions filed in the Supreme Court are not inter-party disputes and have been raised by way of public interest litigation and the controversy before the court is as to whether for social safety and for creating a hazardless environment for the people to live in, mining in the area must be permitted or stopped. Even if it is said that there was a final order, in a dispute of this type it would be difficult to entertain the plea of Res Judicata.

The Court was of the view that leaving the question open for examination in future would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings and would be against the interests of the society. It is mete and proper as also in the interest of the parties that the entire question is taken into account at this stage. Undoubtedly, the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 has come into force with effect from 19 November 1986. Under this enactment, power became vested in the Central Government to take measures to protect and improve the environment. These writ petitions were filed as early as 1983 more than three years before the enactment came into force. The principle of Res Judicata does not apply strictly to public interest litigations. The procedural laws are not fully applicable to public interest litigation cases. Where the prior public interest relates to illegal mining, subsequent public interest litigation to protect environment is not barred.

In Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal, the Supreme Court was directly called upon to decide the question. The apex court held that the principle would apply to public interest litigation provided it was a bona fide litigation.

In another case of Ramdas Nayak v. Union of India, the court observed:

It is a repetitive litigation on the very same issue coming up before the courts again and again in the grab of public interest litigation. It is high time to put an end to the same.These were few cases in which the Court pronounced its judgement either in favour or against the doctrine of Res Judicata.

The Doctrine of Res Judicata can be understood as something which restrains the either party to move the clock back during the pendency of the proceedings. The extend of Res Judicata is very-very wide and it includes a lot of things which even includes Public Interest Litigations. This doctrine is applicable even outside the Code of Civil Procedure and covers a lot of areas which are related to the society and people. The scope and the extend has widened with the passage of time and the Supreme Court has elongated the areas with its judgments.

Wednesday, December 20, 2017

To check Police harassment, this HC issues Guidelines on how people should be summoned for interrogation

Bench said, it would not turn a blind eye to instances of harassment by the police under the guise of investigation.

Guidelines have been issued by the Madras HC has issued on how people should be summoned for interrogation in the criminal cases; in a bid to check harassment by the Police.

According to guidelines, the investigation officer is mandated to issue written summons under Criminal Procedure of Code S. 160 specifying the date & time when calling any person named in the complaint or witness to appear for inquiry.

“This Court, exercising its power under S. 482 CrPC normally wouldn’t interfere with the investigation conducted by a police officer,” said Justice M.S. Ramesh in the order.
“Nevertheless, it’d also not turn a blind eye to instances of harassment by Police, under the guise of investigation brought to its notice.”
The plea was filed by A. N. Lalman Lal & 4 others alleging police harassment under the guise of inquiry, it was heard by the High Court on Thursday.
While the Madras High Court acknowledged that the term ‘harassment’ itself has a ‘very wide meaning’, in order to circumvent the situations where it’s definition can be misconstrued, it issued guidelines.
Justice M.S. Ramesh said that officer is expected to record the minutes of inquiry in station diary & officer shouldn’t harass persons called for inquiry.
In his order, he also emphasized that while the magistrates do play a crucial role in the proceedings, it didn’t give them a licence to interfere in the investigation.
“Though Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to be a guardian in all the stages of police investigation, there’s no power envisaging him to interfere with the actual investigation or the mode of investigation,” the Judge said.

NO IMMEDIATE ARREST OF HUSBAND UNDER SEC 498A IPC


According to Reports of National Crime Record Bureau in 2005, for a total 58,319 cases reported under Section 498 A IPC, a total of 1,27,560 people were arrested, and 6,141 cases were declared false on account of mistake of fact or law. While in 2009 for a total 89,546 cases reported, a total of 1,74,395 people were arrested and 8,352 cases were declared false on account of mistake of fact or law.
   In India there are many laws which protect women’s matrimonial rights and liberties and save them from inhumane treatment.  “Sec 498 A” IPC  makes it clear that any harassment either done by husband or his relatives towards wife , is a criminal act and punishable by law. Let’s check it out what “Sec 498 A” Indian Penal Code says -
498AHusband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be pun­ished with imprisonment for a term which may extend tothree years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,“cruelty” means
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
   Earlier it was directed that once an F.I.R is registered against the Husband or his relatives under Sec 498A IPC, an immediate arrest of the husband or his relative shall be made by the police. There was no scapegoat for the husband or his relative mentioned in F.I.R.
  But recent judgment made by Supreme Court made it clear that an immediate arrest is not necessary in case of Sec 498A IPC.

                                                    JUDGMENT
Rajesh Sharma and others Vs State of Uttar Pradesh
 Following are the points specified by the Supreme Court:
 (a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.
(b) The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.
(c) Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.
(d) Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.
(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.
(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected.
(h) The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.
Conclusion: Though after so much hue and cry Supreme Court has agreed to review it’s decision passed in Rajesh Sharma and others Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, but after seeing the record presented by National Crime Record Bureau, there is no dilemma that Sec 498 A IPC is being misused extensively and it needs to be stopped by the proper law. The judgment passed by the Supreme Court might have kept women’s right on stake but there is need of strict law to curb the malpractices on the name of Sec 498 A IPC.  

Monday, December 18, 2017

Whether divorce is permissible even if wife has not sought cancellation of marriage certificate?

Adverting to the contention that the instant petition was not maintainable, in the absence of seeking cancellation of marriage certificate, we are of the considered view that this argument is only noted to be rejected because the conditions for a Hindu marriage are governed by Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 and the ceremonies which solemnizes a marriage is described in Section 7 of the Act. The registration of Hindu marriages under Section 8 of the Act is for the purpose of facilitating the proof of Hindu marriage. In paragraph 2 of statement of objections filed by the appellant, it is admitted by him that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 10.12.2010 in Raghavendra Kalyan Mantap as per Hindu rights. This admission in the form of pleading is also extracted in paragraph No. 14 of the impugned judgment. Therefore, the contentions urged with regard to non-cancellation of marriage certificate deserves to be rejected.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)
M.F.A. No. 100591/2016 (MC)
Decided On: 18.03.2016
Appellants: Sudhir 
Vs.
Respondent: Jyoti
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.G. Ramesh and P.S. Dinesh Kumar, JJ.
Citation:AIR 2016 karnat 97


1. In this appeal, appellant-husband has challenged the judgment and order dated 27.11.2015, in M.C.58/2013, dissolving his marriage solemnised with respondent wife on 10.12.2010.
2. Heard Shri Anant Hegde, learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri Vijay M. Malali, learned Counsel for the respondent.
3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are, marriage of appellant and respondent was solemnised on 10.12.2010 as per Hindu rights and customs. They lived together for a short spell of one month in Goa, where the appellant resides. Thereafter, according to respondent, family discord started surfacing. In the meanwhile, the respondent took up a job with Canara Bank. She also registered a private complaint against the appellant in the Court of the learned JMFC, Sirsi. Efforts made to reconcile the differences was of no avail. From and after November 2012, both appellant and respondent lived separately. Respondent filed the instant petition seeking divorce and dissolution of marriage during September 2013 under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Petition was resisted by filing statement of objections, denying petition averments, except solemnisation of marriage. After trial, on consideration of the material on record, the petition filed by the respondent is allowed by the impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal.
4. Supporting the appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that:
"(i) the respondent has filed the instant petition with false and incorrect averments. The learned family Court has misread the pleading and evidence on record and wrongly held that the relationship between the parties is strained and irretrievable;
(ii) the respondent did not seek cancellation of certificate of marriage-Ex. R2. Without the said certificate being declared as void, the judgment and order passed by the Family Court is unsustainable in law;
(iii) respondent has collected Rs. 4,00,000/- forcibly from the appellant with the help of police, with an offer to withdraw private complaint lodged by her. Therefore, the impugned order without refund of the said sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- is not sustainable in law;
(iv) appellant has always been kind and loving towards the respondent and continues to be so as on date. He is desirous of continuing the marital relation."
With the above contentions, learned Counsel for the appellant prayed for allowing this appeal.
5. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent-wife submitted that the respondent has been a victim of cruelty in the hands of appellant-husband. He submitted that within a short span of one month of marriage, appellant and his family members started harassing the respondent for dowry. They took her to Sirsi and on way back, they dropped her in Hubli bus stand and announced that they were not interested in the marriage any further. She had no other option but to seek refuge in her parental home and also take up a job for her livelihood. The physical and mental ill treatment meted out to her by appellant and her family members wrecked her life. During her stay in the matrimonial home, she had discovered that the appellant was suffering with almost a near total blindness of 90% which would affect their children also. The parents of respondent suggested the appellant to take proper medical treatment and to undergo surgery. They offered to bear all expenses. However, the appellant and his parents instead of accepting the medical condition, insulted the respondent and her parents. In addition, their demand for dowry kept persisting compelling the respondent to lodge a private complaint before the learned Magistrate. During the course of investigation by the police pursuant to the said complaint, the appellant offered and agreed to file a joint petition for divorce and the same was filed in M.C. No. 81/2012. After filing the said petition, the appellant took an \J' turn and filed a petition before the Sessions Judge, Karwar, contending inter alia that the investigating officer had forcibly collected Rs. 4,00,000/- and sought a direction for refund of the same.
6. He further contended that the appellant had misrepresented at the time of marriage proposal that he was a Mechanical Engineer. When questioned during the cross-examination, he has stated that he did not remember to have given such false information. Adverting to the cross-examination, the learned Counsel submitted that it is recorded by the Family Court that the appellant admitted that he was not able to read even after wearing his spectacles. When the family Court questioned if the appellant was ready to undergo a medical test for the eye defect, it was replied by the appellant that he was ready to undergo such test upon a condition that the respondent should undergo a Virginity test'. It is further admitted by the appellant in the cross-examination that from and after 18.11.2012, he did not return from Goa. In sum and substance, he submitted that the appellant had misrepresented himself as an Engineer; he was suffering from serious defect in his eyes which is near to total blindness; appellant and his family members have meted out mental cruelty upon the respondent; and appellant has deserted the respondent at least from 18.11.2012 as per his own admission. With these submissions, he prayed for dismissal of this appeal.
7. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties and perused the records.
8. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, learned Family Court has extracted a portion of the cross-examination of the appellant verbatim. We have perused the said portion carefully. It contains the entire gist of the case. The family Court has recorded that the appellant was not able to read a document even after wearing spectacles. When he asked, whether he was ready to undergo a test for defect in the eyes, he has consented with a condition that the respondent should undergo a virginity test. Having perused the evidence of the appellant, we have no hesitation to repel the first contention of the appellant that the family Court has misread the evidence on record.
9. Adverting to the contention that the instant petition was not maintainable, in the absence of seeking cancellation of marriage certificate, we are of the considered view that this argument is only noted to be rejected because the conditions for a Hindu marriage are governed by Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 and the ceremonies which solemnizes a marriage is described in Section 7 of the Act. The registration of Hindu marriages under Section 8 of the Act is for the purpose of facilitating the proof of Hindu marriage. In paragraph 2 of statement of objections filed by the appellant, it is admitted by him that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 10.12.2010 in Raghavendra Kalyan Mantap as per Hindu rights. This admission in the form of pleading is also extracted in paragraph No. 14 of the impugned judgment. Therefore, the contentions urged with regard to non-cancellation of marriage certificate deserves to be rejected.
10. With regard to non-refund of a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/-, we notice that no evidence is brought on record by the appellant before the family Court except an oral assertion. Hence, this ground is too fragile to be countenanced.
11. Adverting to the last ground and assertion that the appellant has been kind and loving towards the respondent, we are of the considered view that the evidence on record and particularly the cross-examination extracted in the judgment of the family Court is contrary to the assertion of kindness. It is noted that the learned family Court Judge has recorded a finding to the effect that even after wearing spectacles, appellant was not able to identify a document. When asked about undergoing a medical test, he did not readily agree but posed several conditions. He demanded that the doctor who would examine must disclose the decease from which he was suffering, whether the decease had any treatment, whether a person with such decease should not marry and whether the decease could be hereditary in nature. In addition, he also posed another condition that the respondent should undergo a virginity test. When asked for the reason to pose the said condition, he has stated that there are no specific reasons but he desired that she should undergo the said test as of course.
12. The extracted portion of the cross-examination further indicates that the appellant had stated before the Family Court that he had furnished his bio-data to the respondent prior to the marriage. He has admitted in cross - examination that he had not mentioned about the vision defect in the bio-data. With regard to the allegation that the appellant had misrepresented that he was a Mechanical Engineer, he had stated that he did not remember whether he had given such wrong information in the bio-data.
13. Admittedly, the petition is filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Under the said provision, if the allegation of cruelty is proved by the party claiming, he/she shall be entitled for dissolution of his/her marriage.
14. The facts that the petitioner was not able to identify the document even after wearing the spectacles and he was not prepared to undergo a medical test, strongly suggest that the appellant did have a defect in his vision. He has admitted in the cross-examination that he had not mentioned about vision defect in his bio-data. In order to avoid a medical test, he has posed several conditions including a virginity of respondent without any valid reason. Such conduct of the appellant is reprehensible. The demand put forth by the appellant for a virginity test of respondent while standing in the dock in an open court without having laid any foundation in the pleading nor having produced any prima-facie evidence, is highly recalcitrant. In our considered view, such imperious behaviour which touches upon the self-esteem of a lady cannot be ignored.
15. The appellant has also admitted that he has not returned from Goa after 18.11.2012 and deserted the respondent without any valid reason. Having carefully considered all the aspects of the case, we are of the view that the appellant has inflicted mental cruelty upon the respondent.
16. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Huvakka v. Vishwanath reported in ILR 2009 KAR 4193, after considering several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"16. If the spouses are living separately for considerable time, and there is no love lost between them, the marriage is dead, emotionally and practically there is no chance of it being retrieved, continuance of marital relationship for name sake itself constitutes cruelty of mind. In such circumstances, trying to find out who is the cause for such sorry state of affairs would be an exercise in futility. The only purpose which it may serve is to compensate the wronged spouse monetarily by way of damages for agony and suffering underwent for no fault of that spouse. That is the price one spouse has to pay to the other for wrong done. It will also be a consideration for the freedom, the spouse would enjoy after severance of the matrimonial bondage."
17. In the case of Huvakka supra, the petitioner-wife was not seeking any compensation from the husband. In the instant case also, the respondent-wife who was present at the time of hearing stated that she is not interested in any monetary benefit and would be content with just an order of divorce and beseeched the Court to grant her the relief, by dismissing this appeal.
18. Following the judgment in Huvakka, another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. G. Premalatha @ N. Premalatha v. Sri. R. Nagesh reported in MANU/KA/2276/2015 : ILR 2015 KAR 4863 has held as follows:
"13...................................................................... As held by the Division bench of this Court, living separately and continuance of marital relationship for name sake by it self is cruelty of mind (See Huvakka v. Vishwanath ILR 2009 KAR 4193). Time has changed. So also the perception of society vis-à-vis the institution of marriage. We are living in 21st century in an era of global village concept. Rights of individuals and their personal space in life is being sought in no uncertain terms by citizen across the globe. Rights of individuals enshrined under the Constitution of India have been expanded much folds. To live with dignity is sine qua non of Article 21. Here is a lady knocking at the doors of the family Court and this Court from the year 2012 seeking relief from the fetters of institutional bond of marriage.
14. In our considered view, every human being is entitled to have his/her own space in the life and to live in the manner felt appropriate subject of-course without a fragrant transgression of well established customs and prevalent law. In this backdrop, the judgment and decree of the family Court refusing to dissolve the marriage is too harsh and based on findings recorded which are not sustainable in law. With the change in times, Courts cannot be oblivious to the circumstances existing in the Society and metamorphosis in the behavioural pattern of the society."
19. Resultantly, we are of the considered view that the appeal filed by the husband is devoid of merit. A man with 90% vision defect has misrepresented himself as a Mechanical Engineer. He has put forth an unreasonable demand for a virginity test and caused immense trauma in the life of respondent. She has undergone untold misery ever since the date of marriage.
20. Though the evidence, particularly his own admission in the cross-examination is heavily loaded against him, yet, the appellant has emboldened himself to present this appeal. Therefore, this appeal deserves to be allowed with costs throughout.
21. In the result, the appeal fails and stands dismissed with the costs of Rs. 10,000/-.

Sunday, December 17, 2017

Whether aggrieved person can file petition under DV Act at place of her temporary residence?

Learned counsel for the opposite party on the other hand contended that in the application itself, in column no.3, it is mentioned that the opposite party is now residing in the house of her elder daughter namely, Santoshi Kumari Sahu at Phulbani and that her present address is at Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani and therefore, the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani has got jurisdiction to entertain the application. Section 27 of the 2005 Act deals with the jurisdiction of the competent Court to pass necessary orders under the Act and also to try the offences under the Act. Section 27 of 2005 Act reads as follows:-
“27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which:-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or 
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or  
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.” Thus in view of section 27, if the ‘aggrieved person’ either permanently or temporarily resides at a place, the Court of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class within the local limits whose jurisdiction such place situates is competent to entertain an application under Section 12 of 2005 Act and to grant protection order and other orders under the Act or try the offences under the Act. The legislature in its wisdom has provided that jurisdiction can be invoked by an ‘aggrieved person’ before the competent Court on the basis of temporary residence. The word “temporarily” means lasting, existing, serving for a time only which is not permanent. A temporary residence is a temporary dwelling place of the aggrieved person who has for the time being decided to make that place as her home. An aggrieved person who has lost her matrimonial home due to domestic violence and was not even allowed to stay at her ancestral house or at her father’s place for some reason or the other and is compelled to take residence, though temporarily, either with one of her relatives or with one of her friends at a place where the domestic violence was not committed can invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate within whose local limits such place of temporary residence situates. The temporary residence includes a place where the aggrieved person was compelled to reside in view of commission of domestic violence. She may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being. A place where the aggrieved person has gone on a casual visit, a lodge or hostel or a guest house or an inn where she stays for a short period or a residence at a place simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person cannot be a place which would satisfy the term “temporarily resides” as appears in section 27. The legislature has provided the aggrieved women who are financially, economically or physically abused wide options to institute a case which best suited their convenience, comfort and accessibility. Section 2(i) of 2005 Act indicates “Magistrate” 6 means the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area were the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise or the respondents resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. Thus even if for a temporary period of time, an aggrieved person is residing at a place, she can seek reliefs under the 2005 Act by filing an appropriate application before the competent Court within the local limits whose jurisdiction such place situates.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
TRPCRL NO. 20 of 2016

 Rabindra Nath Sahu Smt. Susila Sahu 

 P R E S E N T:
MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO

Dated- 14.09.2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4931


S. K. Sahoo, J. Mother’s love is divine. It is unselfish and unending. It flows gently but unrelentingly like the holy water of Ganges. Mother is the root which takes all the pain in growing the child plant and feeds him right from the womb. She is the truest friend who gives support to her child in every situation. She takes food only after her child eats satisfactorily; she sleeps only when her child sleeps comfortably. What a tragedy when a 2 widow mother in the twilight of her life is compelled to leave the house by none else than her son and daughter-in-law? The petitioners are the son and daughter-in-law of the opposite party. The opposite party filed an application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereafter ‘2005 Act’) in the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani against the petitioners seeking reliefs under the Act which was registered as Misc. Case No.3 of 2016. It is the case of the opposite party that the
petitioners subjected her to physical and mental cruelty and drove her out of the house for which she was constrained to take shelter in the house of her elder daughter Santoshi Kumari Sahoo at Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani.
This application under section 407 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioners seeking for transfer of Misc. Case No.3 of 2016 pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani to the Court of S.D.J.M., Berhampur. Heard Mr. Ashok Das, learned counsel for the petitioners and Miss Deepali Mohapatra, learned counsel for the opposite party.3 Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the ancestral house of the opposite party is at Berhampur and now she is also staying at Berhampur and she had earlier instituted two cases against the petitioner no.1 at Berhampur and therefore, the S.D.J.M. Court at Phulbani has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 12 of 2005 Act filed by the opposite party and therefore, the case should be transferred to the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur. Learned counsel for the opposite party on the other hand contended that in the application itself, in column no.3, it is mentioned that the opposite party is now residing in the house of her elder daughter namely, Santoshi Kumari Sahu at Phulbani and that her present address is at Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani and therefore, the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani has got jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Section 27 of the 2005 Act deals with the jurisdiction of the competent Court to pass necessary orders under the Act and also to try the offences under the Act.
Section 27 of 2005 Act reads as follows:-
“27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which:-4
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.” Thus in view of section 27, if the ‘aggrieved person’ either permanently or temporarily resides at a place, the Court of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class within the local limits whose jurisdiction such place situates is competent to entertain an application under Section 12 of 2005 Act and to grant protection order and other orders under the Act or try the offences under the Act. The legislature in its wisdom has provided that jurisdiction can be invoked by an ‘aggrieved person’ before the competent Court on the basis of temporary residence. The word “temporarily” means lasting, existing, serving for a time only which is not permanent. A temporary residence is a temporary dwelling place of the aggrieved person who has for the time being decided to make that place as her home. An aggrieved person who has lost her matrimonial home due to domestic violence and was not even allowed to stay at her ancestral house or at her father’s place for some reason or the other and is compelled to take residence, though temporarily, either with one of her relatives or with one of her friends at a place where the domestic violence was not committed can invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate within whose local limits such place of temporary residence situates. The temporary residence includes a place where the aggrieved person was compelled to reside in view of commission of domestic violence. She may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being. A place where the aggrieved person has gone on a casual visit, a lodge or hostel or a guest house or an inn where she stays for a short period or a residence at a place simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person cannot be a place which would satisfy the term “temporarily resides” as appears in section 27. The legislature has provided the aggrieved women who are financially, economically or physically abused wide options to institute a case which best suited their convenience, comfort and accessibility. Section 2(i) of 2005 Act indicates “Magistrate” 6 means the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area were the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise or the respondents resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. Thus even if for a temporary period of time, an aggrieved person is residing at a place, she can seek reliefs under the 2005 Act by filing an appropriate application before the competent Court within the local limits whose jurisdiction such place situates. Since in the application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act, the opposite party who is the aggrieved person has mentioned her present address as Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani where she is staying in her elder daughter’s house being subjected to domestic violence, the application is maintainable in the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani, Even though the learned counsel for the petitioners disputes the temporary abode of the opposite party at Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani, I am of the opinion that in this application under section 407 Cr.P.C., such disputed facts cannot be adjudicated.
Thus the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners being devoid of merits, the TRPCRL application stands dismissed. The learned Magistrate shall make every endeavor to dispose of Misc. Case No.3 of 2016 within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the order of this Court.
A copy of the order be sent to the learned S.D.J.M.,
Phulbani for compliance.
 …………………………
 S. K. Sahoo, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 14th September, 2016/ Kabita

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