Why No 'Human Rights Court' Yet? SC Pulls Up States [Read Order]

Section 30 of the Protection of Human rights Act, 1993 mandates the states for specifying for each district a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try offences arising out of violation of human rights. 
Later, in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal (2015), the Supreme Court had directed the State Governments to take appropriate action in terms of Section 30 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, in regard to setting up/specifying the Human Rights Courts.

ITEM NO.102, 102.1-102.10    COURT NO.3  SECTION IV

S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

I N D I A

Civil Appeal No(s). 5912/2012

PUNJAB STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Appellant(s)

VERSUS

JATT RAM & ORS.

Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A. No. 6236/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6237/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6232/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6230/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6233/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6235/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6234/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6231/2012 (IV)

CONMT.PET.(C) No. 222/2005 In C.A. No. 6236/2012 (IV)

C.A. No. 6244/2012 (IV)

Date : 10-01-2019 These appeals were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

For Appellant(s)

Mr. Aseem Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. Abhijat P. Medh, AOR 

Mr. Rajesh Sharma, Adv.

Ms. Nidhi Singh Dubey, Adv.

Ms. Sundri, Adv.

Ms. Shalu Sharma, AOR 

Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, AOR 

Mr. Karan Bharihoke, AOR

Ms. Navkiran B., Adv.

Mr. Siddhant Roy, Adv. 

Mr. Mohan Pandey, AOR

For Respondent(s)

Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG

Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Balendu Shekhar, Adv.

Mr. Akansha Kaul, Adv.

Ms. Prerna Kumari, Adv.

Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Adv.

Ms. Sushma Suri, AOR

Mr. B.K. Prasad, Adv.

Ms. Anitha Shenoy, AOR

Ms. Srishti Agnihotri, Adv.

Mr. G.K. Bansal, AOR

Mr. Kuldip Singh, AOR

Mr. Debasis Misra, AOR

Mr. Karan Bharihoke, AOR

Mr. Navkiran Bolay, Adv.

Mr. Siddharth S Ray, Adv.

 Mr. Arun K. Sinha, AOR

Mrs.K.Sarada Devi, AOR

Mr. Abhishek Atrey, AOR

 Mr. Tarun Gupta, AOR

 Mr. Ashish Wad, Adv.

Mr. Jayashree Wad, Adv.

Mr. Sidharth Mahajan, Adv.

Ms. sukriti Jaggi, Adv.

for M/S. J S Wad And Co, AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

At the time of hearing of these matters, Section 30 of the Protection of Human rights Act, 1993  (for short,  "the Act")  was pointed  out to  this Court which reads as under :

"For the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human rights, the State Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said offences.

Provided that nothing in this Section shall apply if

(a)                           A Court of Session is already specified as a special court; or

(b)                           a special court is already constituted, for such offences under any other law for the time being in force."

When     this         provision            came      for        consideration

before a bench of this Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 744, in paragraphs 30 & 38.4 this Court observed as follows :

"30.There is, in our opinion, no reason why the State Governments should not seriously

consider the question of specifying Human Rights Court to try offences arising out of violation of human rights. There is nothing on record to suggest that the Governments have at all made any attempt in this direction or taken steps to consult the Chief Justices of the High Courts of their respective States and examine the feasibility of specifying Human Rights Court in each district within the contemplation of Section 30 of the Act. Beyond that we do not propose to say anything at this stage."

38.4- The State Governments shall take appropriate action in terms of Section 30 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, in regard to setting up/specifying the Human Rights Courts."

Learned counsel for the National Human Rights Commission, fairly states that except in few States, there  is  no  compliance  of  these  orders  and  Session Judges  have  not  been  designated  as  Judges  of  Human Rights Courts created by the Act.        It is also clear that the setting up of these designated Courts, does not involve any        additional infrastructure or additional recruitment of Judges or the staff.

 We see no reason why afore-mentioned judgment of this Court has not been complied with.

Accordingly, issue notice to the             Chief  Secretaries  of  all  the  States,  calling  upon  them  to show  cause  why  appropriate  directions  should  not  be issued in this regard, returnable within eight weeks.

[ Indu Kumari Pokhriyal ]

Asstt. Registrar                                                                       [ Charanjeet Kaur ]

                                                                             A.R.-cum-P.S.

False Dowry Case - Choosing of Forum to Harass Mother-in-law - FIR Quashed

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

BEFORE THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL 

DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2018

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.4666 OF 2016

Puttalakshmi v. State of Karnataka

By Sri Bhaskar D., Adv.

By Sri Nazrulla Khan, HCGP for R-1; Smt. Haleema Ameen, Adv., for Sri S.Vishwajith Shetty, Adv., for R-2

O R D E R

Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.870/2015 on the file of the JMFC III Court, Davanagere arising out of Crime No.63/2014 of Women Police Station, Davangere, are abuse of process of the Court causing failure of ends of justice is the question involved in this case.

2. Petitioner is accused No.2 in Crime No.63/2014 of Women Police Station, which is now pending in C.C.No.870/2015 on the file of the JMFC III Court Davanagere. Her son Puttaveera Venkata Varaprasad is the 1st accused in the said case. 2nd respondent is the wife of the 1staccused.

3. The marriage of 2nd respondent and Puttaveera Venkata Varaprasad (accused No.1) was solemnized on 13.10.2013 in Annavaram, Andhra Pradesh. At the time of marriage, 2nd respondent was residing with her elder sister (C.W.8) in Davanagere. C.W.7 is the husband of C.W.8. Out of the said wedlock, couple have a daughter.

4. 2nd respondent filed complaint dated 19.09.2014 as per Annexure-B before the Women Police Station, Davangere alleging that two months after the marriage, the 1st accused started harassing her demanding Rs. 30 Lakhs from her parents to start business. She further alleged that when she could not yield to his demand on that ground and suspecting her fidelity he started to harass her physically and mentally. She alleged that in December 2013, 1staccused set up house in Hyderabad and they shifted from Davangere to the said house at Hyderabad. She further alleged that at the instigation of petitioner, the 1st accused demanded Rs.30 Lakhs. At the time of marriage, Rs.7.5 Lakhs of cash and 3 tholas of gold was given to him. She alleged that 1st accused threatened that, if she fails to bring Rs.30 Lakhs, he will divorce her.

5. On the said complaint, 1st respondent Police registered FIR as per Annexure-A in Crime No.63/2014 and conducted investigation and charge sheeted the petitioner and accused No.1 for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 114 of Indian Penal Code & Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

6. The trial Court on receiving such charge sheet took cognizance against the petitioner and 1staccused of the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 114 of Indian Penal Code & Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

7. On receipt of summons, petitioner appeared in the said case and the trial court granted bail to her.

8. Sri.Bhaskar.D., the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to assail the impugned proceedings on the following grounds:

(i) As per the complaint itself, cash of Rs.7.5 Lakhs and 3 thola gold was given by the complainant’s family and there is no whisper in the complaint of any demand for such cash or gold;

(ii) As per complaint itself, 1st accused and 2ndrespondent soon after the marriage lived in the house of C.Ws.7 & 8 and thereafter they were residing in Hyderabad. Petitioner is the resident of Vadlamuru Village, East Godavari District, and she was residing with her husband;

(iii) As per the complaint itself, petitioner was the occasional visitor to the house of 1st accused and 2nd respondent;

(iv) There are no specific allegations in the complaint against the petitioner;

(v) Petitioner is 59 years old lady. She has to travel all the way from her native place in Andhra Pradesh to Davanagere to attend the case which causes her hardship and she is roped in the case to harass in that way;

(vi) 1st accused and 2nd respondent entered into a partnership to run professional Educational Training/Consultancy in the name and style of M/s Gomatha Educational Consultancy;

(vii) The payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs was made as the share capital to the 2nd respondent in the firm and the petitioner is totally un-connected to that and she is falsely implicated in the case to bring the 1st accused to terms.

9. In support of his contentions, he seeks to rely upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

I) PREETHI GUPTA –VS- STATE OF JHARKHAND, (2010) 7 SCC 667;

II) VARALA BHARATH KUMAR –VS- STATE OF TELANGANA, (2017) 9 SCC 413.

10. Per contra, Smt. Haleema Ameen the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent seeks to justify the proceedings on the following grounds:

i) There is complaint and statements of witnesses to speak about the overt acts of the petitioner;

ii) There is statement of account in proof for transfer of Rs.7.5 Lakhs to the account of the 1staccused from the account of C.W.4, younger brother of the 2nd respondent;

iii) Petitioner has abetted 1st accused to demand money and to harass 2nd respondent.

11. This Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Preethi Gupta’scase referred to supra, at paragraphs 14 and 35 held as follows:

“14. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent the abuse of process of court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent the abuse of process of court; and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

........

35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband’s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In Varala Bharath Kumar’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding that if the uncontroverted allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint and the material collected in support of the same prima facie do not constitute any offence or make out the case against the accused, such proceedings have to be quashed.

14. Para No. 6 of the judgment in Varala Bharath Kumar’s case read as follows:

“6. It is by now well settled that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where allegations made in the first information report/the complaint or the outcome of investigation as found in the chargesheet, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case against the accused; where the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of the offence alleged; where the uncontroverted allegations made in the first information report or complaint and the material collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of offence alleged and make out a case against the accused; where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indian or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised.”

15. Having regard to the aforesaid judgments, this Court has to see whether there is prima faciematerial against the petitioner to constitute the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 114 of I.P.C. and Section 3 & 4 of D.P. Act.

16. First of all, as per the complaint the petitioner was not residing with the couple, viz., 2ndrespondent and 1st accused. After the marriage admittedly respondent No.2 and her husband lived in the house of C.Ws.7 & 8 at Davanagere. As already pointed out, petitioner is/was resident of Vadlamuru Village, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh. As per complaint allegations themselves, in December 2013, 1st accused set up a house in Hyderabad and 2nd respondent and 1staccused shifted to the house at Hyderabad. As per complaint averments during that time also petitioner was residing in her native Vadlamuru.

17. So far as the payment of Rs.7.5 Lakhs cash and 3 thola gold, in the complaint there is no allegation that the said cash and gold were paid on demand of 1st accused, much less the present petitioner. It is simply said in the complaint that they gave said amount and gold at the time of the marriage.

18. So far as the demand of Rs.30 Lakhs, the allegation against the petitioner is that she abetted the 1st accused to demand that. No where it is said that she demanded that amount. Even this allegation of abetment is too bald. It is not said when she visited the house of the couple at Hyderabad and when the demand was made. Not even the further statement of the complainant is forthcoming in the charge sheet to clarify that. 2ndrespondent is the alleged direct victim of the petitioner. She is not specific in her allegations in terms of date and time. Statements of other witnesses regarding the said abetment are all hearsay. They say they learnt about such abetment through the 2nd respondent.

19. In this context, choosing of forum is also significant. The alleged harassment took place at Hyderabad. Petitioner is aged about 59 years residing in remote place in Andhra Pradesh and the case is filed in Davanagere Women Police Station. Under these circumstances, the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner fully cover this case. The proceedings against the petitioner are nothing but the abuse of the process of the Court and their continuation against the petitioner amounts to failure of ends of justice.

Therefore, the petition is allowed. FIR in Crime No.63/2014 of Women Police Station, Davanagere and consequent proceedings in C.C.No.870/2015 on the file of the JMFC III Court Davanagere, so far they relate to the petitioner are hereby quashed

Sad How Many Divorcees Are Sentenced To A Lifetime Of Alimony Payments

Most people, when they take their wedding vows, hope they'll be together with their spouse until death do them part.
But in the headwinds of love, many don't consider or are simply unaware that in some states, it's possible to be together until death even if you divorce.

Permanent alimony is what it sounds like.

A couple marries and when they divorce, one spouse pays the alimony for the rest of their natural life, or until their spouse's demise—whichever comes first.

In most cases, remarrying quashes the payments, which is why many of the payees opt for living with someone else rather than remarrying.

Even opponents of permanent alimony agree that there are sometimes good reasons for a spouse to receive permanent alimony (e.g., they have a disability preventing them from working).

In other cases, however, when the recipient is healthy and college-educated, it can seem as if fate has smiled upon one person, who now has something akin to lottery winnings for life, and scorned the other as an unlucky soul who now must pay for the mistake of marrying the wrong person for the rest of their life.

Even Powerball winnings end after 20 years, while permanent alimony continues through one's retirement—although the amount paid can be reduced by the courts. Consequently, a number of senior citizens find themselves giving up a chunk of their Social Security check to a spouse who is receiving the same amount of Social Security, plus the alimony.

The permanent alimony trap can be especially maddening for someone like Jane Carter, 43, who is using a pseudonym so she can more freely discuss her husband's case, which will soon be hashed out in court. Her husband separated from his first wife in 2003 and was ordered by the courts to pay his ex-spouse $90,000 a year (not including child support).

They divorced in 2005 and eventually the amount was lowered to $81,000 a year. So far, Carter's husband has paid his ex-wife $800,000 in alimony, and while his monthly alimony payment used to be 30 percent of his income, with the economy the way it's been, 57 percent of his income now goes to his ex-wife.

Unless Carter wins the court's favor, there's seemingly no end in sight. In fact, she says her husband's ex-wife is now after her money. "I have a small nest egg for my 11-year-old son, and her lawyer is trying to find out how much I have for that nest egg because we're in the midst of a modification proceeding," says Carter.

Permanent alimony is a particularly vexing problem for anyone mired in the courts; Carter and her husband are both licensed attorneys and well-versed in the law, and they still find navigating the law challenging.

Many states have abandoned the practice of permanent alimony—or at least reformed the law—but it's still going strong in states such as New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, Connecticut, North Carolina, West Virginia, and Florida. Permanent alimony was created in the days when women didn't go to college and rarely had careers, instead tending to the kids and household. Then it was sorely needed. Now, opponents argue, those reasons for its being are long past.

Debbie Israel, a 47-year-old college math teacher in Miami, is engaged but refuses to marry until permanent alimony is reformed in her state. She began dating her fiance, an engineer, in 2010 after their respective divorces in 2008 and 2009.

After about a year of seeing each other, he proposed. She said yes. But shortly after, Israel was reading up on divorce and learned that in the state of Florida, her wages could wind up in the hands of his ex-wife, which led Israel to become a core member of the Florida Alimony Reform Group, which now has more than 2,000 members.

The nonprofit has been pushing for alimony reform since 2010 and plans to fight other family-law problems once the state reforms alimony—something its divorced founder, Alan Frisher, a Melbourne, Fla., certified divorce financial analyst, is confident will happen. The change could take place as early as this year, with a bill to end permanent alimony expected to go to a vote in the Florida legislature within a few months.

Israel, who is divorced, could have received permanent alimony but declined. She considered it, but when a cousin asked her, "Why would you want to be attached to an unhealthy relationship for the rest of your life," that question stuck with her—ultimately leading her to decline alimony and develop a plan for her to receive child support for her and her ex's son.

Both Israel and Frisher know many people who are mired in the stresses of permanent alimony. Frisher tells of an IT guy who is behind in permanent alimony payments and wakes up every day wondering if this will be the day the sheriff will come knocking on his door.

Israel knows a fellow Florida Alimony Reform Group member who, after discovering her husband having an affair with their nanny, is now paying permanent alimony to her perfectly healthy ex-husband—for the rest of their lives, if the law isn't fixed. Israel laments that she even had a friend who committed suicide over permanent alimony.

"Some people are told that their marriage is ending, and then they feel like they're losing their family since they don't have access to their kids on a daily basis, and they see their finances wiped out, and then they're told that they have to pay their ex for the rest of their life," Israel says. "That can be too much to cope with."

Frisher would like to see alimony in his state limited to half of the marriage. In effect with that law, for example, if someone was married for 18 years, the spouse with less ability to earn an income would have nine years of alimony—presumably ample time to go back to school or find a decent job.

Permanent alimony kills the desire to work hard as well, according to Frisher, who offers an example of a dentist who is a member of the reform group and currently pays his ex-spouse $10,000 a month. He cites another member, a physician paying $6,000 a month.

In both cases, if the dentist and physician were to expand their practices and make more money, the way the laws are written now means their exes could go to court and call for their alimony to be raised.

The current law arguably creates a welfare-type state for the recipients, also killing their desire to work hard, opponents of permanent alimony charge, due to their receiving a de facto monthly annuity for the rest of their lives.

"In some unusual cases, I can see where alimony should be made permanent, such as if a spouse is disabled," says Robin DesCamp, a permanent alimony reform activist in Portland, Oregon, "but there should be a formula, and I personally don't think you should have to give a person more than 25 percent of your income. You shouldn't have to give more than 50 percent of your income to a healthy person who can get a job at Starbucks, for crying out loud."